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Michele Riccardi and Giulia Berlusconi 
Abstract   This chapter discusses the methodological challenges in defining, operationalising and measuring 
organised crime infiltration in legal businesses. It first reviews existing definitions and measures of organised 
crime; it then focuses on infiltration, outlining the differences with respect to the concepts of organised crime 
investments and money laundering. It discusses the strengths and the weaknesses of existing measures and 
methodological approaches (e.g. analysis of statistics on confiscated assets, of personal holdings, of case studies), 
suggesting further directions to improve the collection of data and research in this field. 
Measuring organised crime infiltration in legal businesses requires addressing several issues. Building 
on Black, Vander Beken and De Ruyver (2000) and von Lampe (2004), three methodological steps can 
be identified. First, key concepts – the notion of organised crime and that of infiltration – must be defined 
and specified through a set of inclusion rules. Second, key concepts must be operationalized into 
variables to be used for their measurement. Third, the variables must be linked to available empirical 
data. This chapter first discusses the challenges in defining, operationalising and measuring organised 
crime (hereafter OC); it then focuses on how to define and operationalise infiltration in legitimate 
businesses. It describes the strengths and weaknesses of existing measures and explores further 
directions in terms of research and data collection. 
Defining and measuring organised crime 
Defining organised crime 
One of the main issues in organised crime research is the lack of a common definition, together with the 
complexity of the phenomenon to be described (von Lampe, 2004). Many definitions have been 
developed by international organisations, law enforcement agencies and scholars (Adamoli, Di Nicola, 
Savona & Zoffi, 1998; Albanese, 2000; Finckenauer, 2005; Hagan, 2006; Kenney & Finckenauer, 1995; 
van Dijk, 2007). However, there is no agreed-upon definition of what organised crime is (van Duyne & 
van Dijck, 2007).  
The design of empirical or operational definitions requires determining what should be included in 
the measurement and what should be excluded: in other words, identifying the unit of measurement. 
Counting units include either activities or actors (van Duyne & van Dijck, 2007). The former approach 
focuses on certain types of criminal activities and illegal markets; the latter on the criminal groups active 
in those markets (Paoli, 2002; von Lampe, 2004). As a consequence, some studies measure groups, 
whereas others measure activities (Zoutendijk, 2010). Albanese (2008), for instance, proposed a model 
to assess the risk of organised crime in a given area, and he treated illicit markets as units of analysis. 
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He argued that, if illegal activities are properly assessed and ranked, targeting these activities will make 
it possible to tackle the high-risk organised crime groups involved.  
The recent EU-funded OCP and ARIEL research projects (Savona & Riccardi, 2015; Savona & 
Berlusconi, 2015),1 which analysed organised crime investments and infiltration in the European 
economy, adopted a ‘mixed’ approach which considered both the actors and the illicit activities in which 
they were involved. Building on Europol SOCTA 2013 (Europol, 2013), the projects defined an 
organised crime group as: 
any criminal actor – from large organisations to loose networks of collaborating criminals – that 
falls under the definition provided by the EU Framework Decision on the Fight against Organised 
Crime (2008/841/JHA)2 and/ or is involved in serious crimes as identified by art. 83(1) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.3 
(Savona & Riccardi, 2015; Savona & Berlusconi, 2015) 
Such broad definitions of organised crime have been criticised for their vagueness (Calderoni, 2008; 
Finckenauer, 2005; Hagan, 2006; Maltz, 1996; von Lampe, 2004; Zoutendijk, 2010). However, they 
make it possible to include a variety of criminal organisations and actors, not just crime syndicates, and 
to take account of the differences among European countries, also in terms of organised crime legislation 
(Savona & Riccardi, 2015; Savona & Berlusconi, 2015; von Lampe, 2004). 
Measuring organised crime 
Despite the challenges in defining and operationalising key concepts, in recent years numerous exercises 
have been conducted to measure organised crime at local, national and international level. Measuring 
organised crime has manifold benefits. It helps to understand the scope of the problem within and across 
territories, thus facilitating the allocation of resources and priorities for interventions. In the case of 
repeated measures over time, it also makes it possible to identify trends and to evaluate the effectiveness 
of countermeasures (von Lampe, 2004).  
Most attempts to measure organised crime are made by governments and law enforcement agencies, 
rather than scholars (von Lampe, 2004). The first exercises were annual situation reports on organised 
crime, such as the one published by the German federal police agency Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) since 
1992 (Zoutendijk, 2010). These reports are based on information on ongoing criminal investigations, 
and they provide details on organised crime cases, the types of offences, the offenders (e.g. their 
nationality), and the estimated profits (von Lampe, 2004).  
Over the years, there has been a shift from the measurement of organised crime to the assessment of 
its threat. In threat assessments, the nature and the extent (seriousness) of a phenomenon, not just its 
presence, must be evaluated (van Duyne & van Dijck, 2007; van Duyne, 2006). Organised crime threat 
assessments (OCTA) have been released by several agencies including Europol (Europol, 2013, 2011, 
2009), the Dutch National Police Intelligence Service (IPOL, 2014), and the UK Serious and Organised 
Crime Agency (National Crime Agency, 2014). However, these studies have been criticised by some 
scholars because they lack common definitions (von Lampe, 2004) or because they do not meet the 
requirements of reliability and validity (Zoutendijk, 2010). This also applies to the limited number of 
academic studies in this field (e.g. Albanese, 2001; Vander Beken, 2004) because also in this case 
definitions of key concepts are missing or operational definitions are too vague (Zoutendijk, 2010).  
In order to take full account of the complexity of the phenomenon, some authors (Savona, Dugato & 
Garofalo, 2012; Dugato, De Simoni & Savona, 2014) have proposed measures of organised crime which 
consider not only dimensions related to its activity (e.g. groups and illegal activities) but also the 
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enablers that facilitate or impede such activity, and the responses by the state and civil society. For each 
dimension, several variables have been identified to create composite indicators of the presence of 
organised crime groups in a given territory (Dugato et al., 2014). Yet these scholars, rather than 
measuring organised crime, have assessed its risk. Adopting the taxonomy proposed by the Financial 
Action Task Force for money laundering risk assessment (FATF, 2013), they have focused not only on 
the threat (organised crime itself) but also on the contextual vulnerabilities and, to a lesser extent, on 
their consequences (or impact) on society and the economy. Another example in this regard is the risk-
based methodology developed by the Ghent University Crime Research Group, which was conceived 
as an improvement of the Belgian Annual Report on Organised Crime (Black et al., 2000). This method 
also considers the environmental factors related to organised crime (e.g. socio-economic and political 
factors), and identifies their impact on the likelihood of threat and potential harm.  
Composite indicators, such as the one developed by Dugato et al. (2014), are increasingly used by 
scholars and law enforcement agencies to measure organised crime. In 2013 Transcrime developed the 
‘Mafia Presence Index’ (now under update) to assess, through proxies like mafia homicides and 
confiscated assets, the presence of mafia groups across Italian provinces (Calderoni, 2014; Transcrime, 
2013). Similarly, van Dijk (2007) measured the level of organised crime across countries through the 
so-called ‘Composite Organized Crime Index’, which combined data on the perceived prevalence of 
organised crime in the country, instrumental violence, grand corruption, money laundering, and black 
economy. 
Defining and measuring infiltration in legal businesses 
Defining and operationalising infiltration 
After defining and operationalising the concept of organised crime, it is necessary to specify the notion 
of infiltration. In most European countries criminal infiltration of legal businesses is not criminalised 
per se. Therefore, neither legal definitions of the phenomenon nor police or judicial data are available. 
Infiltration is not an individual offence, but rather a process encompassing a range of offences: for 
example, corruption of public officials, money laundering, intimidation and extortion of entrepreneurs 
or market abuse infractions. These sentinel crimes are not always present at the same time; they may 
occur at different stages of the infiltration process and may vary across time and places. Police or judicial 
data are usually available on sentinel crimes, but recombining them into single cases of infiltration is 
very difficult – and meaningless without a script of the infiltration mechanism.  
One of the first attempts to define and schematise the process of organised crime infiltration in 
legitimate businesses was made by Savona and Berlusconi (2015) for the ARIEL project. They defined 
it as ‘any case in which a natural person belonging to a criminal organisation or acting on its behalf, or 
an already infiltrated legal person, invests financial and/or human resources to participate in the 
decision-making process of a legitimate business’ (Savona & Berlusconi, 2015, p. 19). The definition 
comprises four elements: a criminal organisation; a natural person belonging to a criminal organisation 
or acting on its behalf, or an already infiltrated legal person; the investment of financial and/or human 
resources; participation in the decision-making process of a legitimate business.  
The first element is a criminal organisation. As mentioned, the authors built on the definition of 
organised crime adopted by Europol (2013) and also used by Savona and Riccardi (2015) in their study 
of the economics of OC in Europe (project OCP). The second element is the presence of a natural person 
belonging to a criminal organisation or acting on its behalf, or an already infiltrated legal person. The 
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literature usually considers criminal organisations as collective bodies which take decisions (including 
investment choices) as a whole. Nevertheless, infiltration of legitimate businesses is carried out by 
individuals (or groups) who are members of the organisation or act as figureheads (e.g. relatives, 
lawyers, professionals) (Berlusconi, 2015; Levi, 2015; Sarno, 2015; Transcrime, 2013). It is not always 
possible to distinguish between cases of infiltration driven by personal motives and those dictated by 
the criminal group’s strategy (Savona & Riccardi, 2015), although it is proven that the selection of 
sectors, territories and legal forms of investment may vary widely across different groups within the 
same organisation (Riccardi, 2014b; Transcrime, 2013). In some cases, infiltration is committed by 
another legal person (e.g. company, cooperative, foundation) already controlled by the criminal 
organisation or some of its members, and often employed as an additional layer to conceal the criminal 
beneficial ownership (Berlusconi, 2015; Sarno, 2015; Riccardi, Soriani & Standridge, 2015).  
The third element concerns the technique of infiltration. Financial investment (such as acquisition of 
a share of the equity) is not an essential requirement because legitimate businesses can be infiltrated also 
by employing human resources, for example by appointing a member of the criminal organisation as 
company director or administrator in order to participate in (and eventually acquire control of) the 
business management. Criminals may rely on even more indirect strategies to influence legal 
entrepreneurs or managers and supervisors employed by a legal business: for example, violence and 
intimidation, extortion racketeering, or even usury. In this last case, the entrepreneurs resorting to 
criminal loans often abandon control of the business to their criminal financiers.  
The fourth element that identifies criminal infiltration is participation in the decision-making process 
of the legitimate business. Organised crime, through a member, a straw man, or another legal person, is 
able to influence decisions on business strategies and future investments, as well as hiring, promotions 
and salary increases, subcontracting and supply contracts, security and controls. The influence over the 
decision-making process can be exerted through ownership of (a percentage of) the shares and/or control 
over the management. The control can be exercised by a member of the criminal organisation (internal 
direct control), a straw man acting on behalf of the organisation or an already infiltrated legal business 
(internal indirect control), or through intimidation, violence, or corruption of a manager or a supervisor 
employed by the business (external control). Cases of internal and external control over the management 
can be extended to include low-level employees, provided that the employee takes decisions on hiring 
and promotions, subcontracting and supply contracts, or security and controls, even at the local unit 
level. 
Infiltration vs. investment vs. money laundering 
The concept of organised crime infiltration in part overlaps with the concept of organised crime 
investment, which is in turn related to the notion of money laundering. However, some differences can 
be identified, and they are now discussed.  
In recent years, numerous studies (some gathered in this book) have analysed the so-called portfolio 
of investments of organised crime in various countries (see Levi, 2015 for a review): in Italy (Dugato, 
Giommoni & Favarin, 2015; Riccardi, 2014b; Transcrime, 2013), in the Netherlands (Ferwerda & 
Unger, 2015; Kruisbergen, Kleemans & Kouwenberg, 2015), in Spain (Palomo, Márquez & Ruiz, 2015; 
Steinko, 2012), in France (Riccardi & Salha, 2015), in Ireland (Soriani, 2015), in Finland (Petrell & 
Houtsonen, 2015), in Bulgaria (CSD, 2012) and at European level (Savona & Riccardi, 2015). The 
definition of ‘investment’ adopted by most of these studies is sufficiently broad to encompass 
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any possession and/or acquisition of any type of asset in the legal economy (e.g. movable goods, 
registered assets, real estate properties, companies or their shares) by individuals belonging to a 
criminal group, acting on its behalf and/or involved in one of the criminal activities previously 
identified. 
(Savona & Riccardi, 2015, p. 26) 
The first difference refers to the nature of the ‘target’: while organised crime investments may concern 
assets of any kind (e.g. real estate properties, cars, vehicles, jewels, bonds, and other movable assets), 
infiltration concerns only businesses of any type (from individual enterprises to limited companies, also 
including those listed on the stock exchange) operating in any type of business sector.4 The second 
difference regards the modus operandi, i.e. the type of resource employed: while, as said, infiltration 
can exploit both financial and/or human resources, and does not necessarily lead to ownership of a (share 
of ) the company, investments usually rely on the employment of monetary resources and imply the 
acquisition/possession of the asset (Savona & Riccardi, 2015).  
It should be noted that in the cases of both organised crime investment and infiltration, when financial 
resources are employed, it is not always possible to identify the origin of the capital: it may be ‘dirty’ 
money (i.e. proceeds of illicit activities carried out by the criminal organisation or some of its members), 
laundered money (i.e. the proceeds of illicit activities carried out by the criminal organisation that have 
already been laundered before the investment) or ‘clean’ money (i.e. the proceeds of, at least formally, 
licit activities carried out by the criminal organisation or by some of its members, e.g. profits from other 
legal businesses or the gain from the sale of an inherited property).  
The latter represents the main difference between investments and infiltration, on the one hand, and 
money laundering on the other. Criminals laundering money employ, by definition, ‘dirty’ capital. It is 
the result of a predicate offence, and it passes through a not necessarily sophisticated process – the 
placement, layering and integration scheme as defined by Reuter and Truman (2004) – in order to be 
enjoyed by the criminal while cleansing it and concealing its illicit origin. Organised crime infiltration 
in legitimate businesses may be driven by money laundering purposes, but not necessarily so (see 
Chapter 1 for a review of the drivers of infiltration). As a result, it does not ‘represent full integration in 
the sense that the classic model of legitimation conceives it’ (Levi, 2015, p. 290). 
Measuring infiltration 
Because of all these overlaps, to date the measurement of criminal infiltration of legitimate businesses 
has inevitably intersected with the analysis of criminals’ investments and money laundering activities. 
But even when these are grouped together, the amount of empirical knowledge on the issue remains 
small. This section does not aim to review the findings of the empirical research on organised crime 
infiltration/investments/money laundering (see Levi, 2015); but rather to discuss the strengths and 
weaknesses of the methodological approaches and of the measures adopted by scholars in these studies. 
Seized and confiscated assets 
The first attempts to conduct empirical analysis of criminal infiltration were made in Italy (Riccardi, 
2014b; Transcrime, 2013), and they used companies confiscated from mafia groups as proxies for 
infiltrated businesses (see Chapter 8). By using these data, researchers were able to study the 
geographical and sectorial distribution of businesses infiltrated by mafias, also measuring their 
correlation with contextual variables (e.g. industry profitability, level of tax evasion in the territory) 
(Riccardi, 2014b), their accounting and management strategies (Di Bono, Cincimino, Riccardi & 
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Berlusconi, 2015; Donato, Saporito & Scognamiglio, 2013; Transcrime, 2013), their ownership 
structures (Riccardi et al., 2015; Sarno, 2015), and their interactions with competitors and suppliers 
(Gurciullo, 2014).  
Seized and confiscated assets have been used as proxies for the portfolios of criminal groups in many 
countries. But the analyses have not been restricted to confiscated companies in that other types of goods 
have been considered as well: real estate properties, registered assets (e.g. cars, boats), movable goods 
(e.g. jewels, watches). Generally speaking, rather than analyses of the infiltration of businesses, they 
can be interpreted as studies on investments by criminal groups in the legal economy. Research 
analysing organised crime investments using data on confiscated assets has been conducted, for 
example, in Finland (Petrell & Houtsonen, 2015, see Chapter 10), France (Riccardi & Salha, 2015, see 
Chapter 9), Ireland (Soriani, 2015), Spain (Palomo et al., 2015), Netherlands (Ferwerda & Unger, 2015; 
van Duyne & Soudijn, 2009) and, again, Italy with respect to both businesses (Riccardi, 2014b; 
Transcrime, 2013) and real estate (Dugato et al., 2015).  
Use of these data has made innovative contributions to study of the financial aspects of criminal 
organisations, but it has some limitations. First, it may lead to underestimations or overestimations of 
certain types of goods depending on the focus of law enforcement on certain crimes, the ease of taking 
certain types of assets into custody, and the legal instruments at the disposal of prosecutors (Transcrime, 
2013, p. 95). Second, it does not allow comparisons to be made, since asset recovery regulation varies 
widely across regions and countries (Savona & Riccardi, 2015, p. 224). Third, it may furnish an outdated 
picture of criminal investments, because very long periods often elapse between the financial 
investigation and final forfeiture of the asset (Transcrime, 2013, p. 95). Fourth, it may not cover those 
types of criminal infiltration which do not require ownership of the asset. Moreover, good data are 
lacking: only a few countries, at least in the EU, produce systematic statistics on the asset recovery 
process, and only a few provide disaggregated information for each confiscated asset – the only 
information which allows in-depth statistical analysis (Europol Criminal Asset Bureau, 2015; Savona & 
Riccardi, 2015).  
As a result, rather than providing a picture of the actual OC portfolio, confiscated goods may be a 
measure of how good prosecutors and police are in tracing and recovering criminal assets. For example, 
in most EU member states the majority of seized goods are cash and bank accounts, while confiscation 
of businesses is very rare. The reason for this, as suggested by some authors, is not a lack of interest 
among criminals in investing in companies, but the difficulties (and the lack of interest) of law 
enforcement in tracing them (Savona & Riccardi, 2015). 
Personal holdings and expenditure patterns 
An alternative, but less frequent, approach is to consider the personal holdings of offenders, or their 
expenditure patterns. Meloen et al. (2003) mixed police and financial records and conducted a detailed 
study on the composition of the holdings of 52 criminals in the Netherlands, distinguishing among 
hoardings (e.g. cash), consumption (e.g. vehicles), and investment goods (e.g. immovable properties, 
securities). This approach has yielded valuable insights into where offenders employ their illegal 
earnings, but it has not focused on how the ownership of these assets (including companies) was 
acquired.  
In the UK, 222 prisoners convicted for drug crimes were interviewed to explore their patterns of 
consumption and laundering (Matrix Research & Consultancy, 2007). According to the responses, cases 
of laundering through legitimate businesses are very rare, while dirtiest cash is spent on lifestyle or to 
pay mortgages, or is reinvested in drug trafficking. A similar approach was adopted by Webb and 
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Burrows (2009), who interviewed imprisoned human traffickers in the UK. Despite some evidence of 
criminal investments in shops, hotels and restaurants, the study did not provide information on how 
these businesses had been infiltrated. Petrunov (2011) also studied the strategy of managing and 
laundering money acquired from human trafficking through interviewing 152 sex traffickers, sex 
workers, police officers and prosecutors in Bulgaria. But a focus on the infiltration process was lacking.  
Figures on personal holdings and expenditure patterns have a strong potential, and they are less biased 
by regulatory asymmetries than are data on seizures and confiscations. However, they have drawbacks 
too. First, due to privacy reasons, it is very difficult to access the personal records of offenders (e.g. 
bank accounts, tax declarations, income statements). On the other hand, self-reported figures may be 
affected by survey bias and a lack of transparency by respondents. Second, this approach almost 
exclusively focuses on individual holdings and individual expenditures, while it does not take account 
of those which can be attributed to the criminal organisation as a whole. Third, personal holdings by 
definition concern only owned assets, so that consideration is not made of cases in which control is 
acquired and exercised through other means (e.g. straw men, managers, shell companies) which do not 
require a direct asset ownership. 
Case studies 
Overall, the two approaches discussed above have a major shortcoming: they make it possible to 
understand where (which type of asset, which business sector, which region) criminals employ their 
proceeds, but they do not explain why and how. For example, data on confiscated companies can reveal 
that a certain sector registers more cases of infiltration than others, but they do not provide information 
on either the purpose or the modus operandi followed by criminals to infiltrate them.  
In order to address this gap, and the other issues presented above, researchers have often resorted to 
the analysis of case studies. This approach makes it possible to gather information not only on the type 
of asset or business sector involved but also on the nature of the criminal actor, on the technique used 
to infiltrate/launder money, on the purpose of the investment – in other words, on the entire 
infiltration/investment/money laundering process. Inevitably, the quantitative approach is sacrificed in 
favour of a more qualitative and narrative one, e.g. in the form of script analysis.  
Case studies have been used to analyse a variety of money laundering and investment activities: for 
example, organised crime investments in the Netherlands (Kruisbergen et al., 2015, on 150 cases from 
the Dutch Organised Crime Monitor, equivalent to 1,196 assets); money laundering in Spain (Steinko, 
2012, on cases taken from 363 court sentences) and in Germany (Suendorf, 2001, on 40 cases); the 
relationship among organised crime, money laundering and the real estate market in Canada (Schneider, 
2004, on 150 cases); the ownership and management strategies of mafia-owned companies in Italy 
(Transcrime, 2013, on around 100 cases of infiltrated businesses); infiltration by organised crime of the 
wind power sector in Italy (Caneppele, Riccardi & Standridge, 2013, on about 15 cases) and by mafias 
in Northern Italy (Alessandri, Montani & Miedico, 2014). Moreover, case studies are quite successfully 
used by FATF in its reports on the types and trends of money laundering, and they are also often included 
by most European FIUs in their annual reports.  
Information on cases is usually gathered from judicial files and court documents (as in Steinko, 2012), 
police investigation files (as in Schneider, 2004, or in Kruisbergen et al., 2015), and institutional reports, 
but also from academic literature, media and newspaper articles. Some studies rely on all these sources 
together (e.g. Savona & Berlusconi, 2015; Savona & Riccardi, 2015; Transcrime, 2013). Cases can be 
selected according to whether they include specific offences (e.g. ‘money laundering’, ‘participation in 
a criminal association’, ‘possession of the proceeds of crime’, depending on the focus of the study and 
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on the relevant legislation), to the type of criminal actor involved, to the type of asset (e.g. real estate 
properties, companies), to a selected time range, or to specific monetary values.  
Projects OCP (Savona & Riccardi, 2015) and ARIEL (Savona & Berlusconi, 2015), on which most 
of the chapters of this book are based, adopted a very similar methodological approach. The former 
applied it to the study of organised crime investments, and the latter to criminal infiltration of legitimate 
businesses. For example, Savona and Berlusconi (2015) collected evidence responding to the definition 
of infiltration presented in the previous section from a plurality of sources, including judicial files, 
institutional reports, LEA reports, academic studies, media and newspaper articles. The wide range of 
sources used was intended to address the gaps in terms of data availability across countries: for example, 
whereas cases can be easily found in LEA reports in Italy and Ireland, in Spain and the United Kingdom 
they cannot. The evidence gathered was coded in order to highlight aspects such as the geographic region 
of infiltration, the business sector, and the criminal organisation involved. It was then organised into a 
database structured so that each record represented a reference to one business sector or one region. As 
a result, the database included 2,380 references to OC infiltration (Savona & Berlusconi, 2015, p. 23). 
The strategy used by Savona and Riccardi (2015) for the collection of evidence of OC investments was 
similar.  
A narrative approach based on the analysis of case studies makes it possible to go beyond numbers 
and to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the infiltration process. However, it can be 
questioned because individual cases are not necessarily representative of the phenomenon as a whole, 
as pointed out by Levi (2015, p. 280): ‘it is not clear how (un)representative known cases are of unknown 
cases’; and they are not very useful for sound quantitative analysis. Moreover, differences in terms of 
regulation, data availability, and nature of the sources make it very difficult to produce cross-country 
comparisons. But criminal infiltration, like organised crime and money laundering, is transnational by 
nature, and cross-country biases are unavoidable challenges to be faced with in these kinds of studies. 
Other methodological issues in measuring infiltration of legal businesses 
Other methodological issues arise, in particular if the intention is to carry out financial statement analysis 
of infiltrated businesses. First, the literature shows that accounting manipulations are very likely in the 
case of companies owned by criminals and used to commit illegal activities such as money laundering 
or fraud (Di Bono et al., 2015; Transcrime, 2013). Therefore, company accounts do not often provide a 
true picture of the economic and financial situation of the infiltrated business. In particular income 
statements are more easily and more often falsified than balance sheets to minimise the taxable income.  
Second, infiltrated companies may change their management strategy over time, and this behaviour 
may be reflected in accounting terms. For example, criminals may start disinvesting and liquidating 
companies’ assets as soon as they suspect that they are under investigation (Di Bono et al., 2015; Donato 
et al., 2013; Riccardi, 2014a). When confiscated companies are analysed, researchers should pay 
attention also to the effects produced by judicial administration on a company’s accounts. For this 
reason, the study of infiltrated companies should not focus only on a certain point in time; ideally, it 
should cover a time range broad enough to span from the infiltration to the investigation, and then to 
seizure of the business. Unfortunately, historical records in business registers are not easy to find, nor 
are financial statements or ownership data, so that retrospective analysis of infiltrated companies is often 
very challenging (Savona & Berlusconi, 2015; Transcrime, 2013). 
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Future directions in research and data collection 
Organised crime infiltration in companies is a complex phenomenon, and its study is still pioneering. It 
is more advanced in some regions (e.g. Italy) which have experienced mafia intrusion in the legal 
economy for decades; it is less developed in other countries which are still asking what infiltration is 
and whether it really constitutes a crime. And as for any other exploratory study, it would be wrong to 
focus on only one future direction of research. Instead, it is suggested that all the following areas should 
be improved in order to extend the ‘arsenal’ at the disposal of scholars and practitioners in this field. 
Improving the identification of cases of infiltration 
Cases of organised crime infiltration in legal businesses could be identified more precisely through better 
specification of the sentinel crimes involved in the infiltration process: money laundering, market 
manipulation, public or private corruption, etc. A script analysis of the already collected cases could 
help to identify these offences, also taking account of differences in terms of regulation and legal 
definitions across countries. Following the script, and adopting a bottom-up approach, those judicial 
cases including the sentinel crimes identified (or a combination of them) could be more easily recognised 
and thus collected; and then constitute the basis for gathering further information on the infiltration (e.g. 
ownership data on the infiltrated businesses, financial accounts).  
Focusing on sentinel crimes, rather than cases themselves, would have two main advantages: first, it 
would shift the attention from actors to activities, thus circumventing the never-ending debate on what 
organised crime is while focusing on what criminals do. Second, it would be more useful for 
practitioners (prosecutors, investigators, lawyers, professionals) because it would offer them a legal 
basis to apply the research findings in their everyday activities. 
Improving the availability of judicial files and of data on confiscated assets 
This approach would be effective only if access to judicial files is improved. In most European countries, 
court sentences and other judicial documents can be obtained from individual prosecutors, but this does 
not guarantee a systematic and comprehensive collection of all the relevant cases. Instead, access to 
centralised databases of judicial files should be improved and opened to researchers; and the tools for 
searching across these datasets should be strengthened, for example by enabling multiple queries per 
type of criminal offence, nationality of the offender, type of asset involved, and monetary value.  
EU agencies should foster also the collection of better statistics on seized and confiscated assets (in 
line with Art. 11 of Directive 2014/42/EU) and guarantee access to researchers. Previous reports have 
highlighted that these data across EU member states are lacking and of a poor quality (Savona & 
Riccardi, 2015; Europol Criminal Asset Bureau, 2015). In particular, microdata (i.e. per each individual 
asset) should be made available to researchers so that sounder statistical analysis is possible. 
Exploring new methodological approaches and new sources of information 
As said, quantitative analysis of hard data (e.g. statistics on confiscated companies, personal holdings 
of offenders) is not sufficient to gain full understanding of the drivers and the modi operandi of criminal 
infiltration in legitimate companies. It is necessary to mix such analysis with a more narrative approach 
that looks at the story of the infiltration, the actors involved, and the contextual factors.  
To this end, ‘softer’ information on the cases identified should be collected: for example, by 
expanding the interviews to include offenders, prosecutors, investigators, entrepreneurs (both victims 
and facilitators of infiltration), professionals, and other intermediaries. Individual interviews, focus 
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groups or surveys could be set up for this purpose; or existing ones (e.g. surveys on offenders’ illegal 
earnings) could be adapted for this scope.  
In order to improve the financial analysis of infiltrated businesses, approaches typical of business 
studies – primarily forensic accounting and corporate governance – could be adopted. In parallel, the 
analysis of company accounts could be enriched by means of interviews with managers, judicial 
administrators and suppliers so as to circumvent accounting manipulations and obtain a more accurate 
picture of the economic performance and the management strategy of infiltrated companies (Di Bono et 
al., 2015). 
Moving from analysis of past cases to assessment of the risk of infiltration 
Finally, a risk assessment approach could be adopted also in the study of criminal infiltration in legal 
businesses, in the same way as it has been successfully applied to other fields such as money laundering 
or corruption (see Chapter 12). Adopting the FATF taxonomy used in money laundering risk assessment 
(see Dawe, 2013; FATF, 2013) to evaluate the risk of criminal infiltration would require identifying and 
measuring the threats of infiltration, the vulnerabilities which facilitate it (e.g. loopholes in the 
regulation, weaknesses in the business structure of a company or of a sector), and the impact 
(consequences) that infiltration would have on the market, the economy, and the society as a whole.  
The risk could be assessed by considering risk factors on various dimensions: territory, business 
sector, management strategy, ownership structure (see Chapter 12). And it could be customised 
according to the nature of the end-user. This approach would make it possible to transfer the results of 
the research on criminal infiltration into tools useful for the everyday activities of practitioners: for 
example, intermediaries (banks, notaries, lawyers) subject to AML obligations to conduct customer due 
diligence; or public bodies (e.g. municipalities, regional governments) to assess the risk of infiltration 
in (and manipulation of ) public procurements; or LEA and ARO agencies to identify the companies on 
which to focus investigation and monitoring. 
Notes 
1 Project OCP – Organised Crime Portfolio (www.ocportfolio.eu) – was co-funded by the European Commission, 
DG Home Affairs and carried out in 2012–2013 by an international consortium coordinated by Transcrime, Joint 
Research Centre on Transnational Crime (www.transcrime.it). Project ARIEL – Assessing the Risk of the 
Infiltration of Organized Crime in EU MSs Legitimate Economies: a Pilot Project in 5 EU Countries 
(www.arielproject.eu) – was also co-funded by the European Commission and coordinated by Transcrime in 2014–
2015. 
2 Art. 1 of the EU Framework Decision on the Fight against Organised Crime defines a criminal organisation as: 
a structured association, established over a period of time, of more than two persons acting in concert with 
a view to committing offences which are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a 
maximum of at least four years or a more serious penalty, to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or 
other material benefit. 
(Council of the European Union, 2008) 
3 Art. 83(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) identifies ‘serious crimes’ as: 
‘terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, 
illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and 
organised crime’ (European Union, 2012). In addition to these, Savona & Riccardi (2015) covered further criminal 
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activities (namely illicit trade in tobacco products, counterfeiting, illegal gambling and match fixing, extortion 
racketeering, usury, fraud and organised property crime) which are not listed in the TFEU but were considered by 
the authors relevant to the study of the economics of organised crime groups in Europe (Savona & Riccardi, 2015, 
p. 26). 
4 In truth, infiltration can also target other types of legal entities and organisations, such as public administration 
agencies, city councils or regional governments. In Italy, for example, city councils may be dissolved and put 
under the administration of the Interior Ministry as a result of a decree proving their infiltration by mafia groups 
(on the basis of Art. 143 D.Lgs 267/2000). 
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